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ON DOCTORS AND JUDGES
BARAK RICHMAN†
In convening the Conference on Measuring Judges and Justice
and assembling this impressive Symposium, Dean David Levi and
Professor Mitu Gulati urged the participating judges, political
1
scientists, and law professors to “live in fragments no longer.” Within
that same spirit of cross-fertilization—aiming to forge dialogue across
disciplines and seeking lessons from unfamiliar professions—I
introduce in this Response some lessons from studying the medical
profession. Relying on economics and sociology more than political
2
science, I suggest that there is much to learn about judges from
thinking about doctors.
A superficial comparison between doctors and judges suggests
that their social roles have much in common. Both wear austere
frocks of uniform color. Both publicly commit to solemn oaths before
beginning service. Both are addressed by their professional titles to
convey respect, even outside their workplace. Both are atop a strict
hierarchy, in which their words receive the highest deference and
their relationships with others are characterized by authority and
control.
For Nobel Prize–winning economist Kenneth Arrow, these social
symbols were—for doctors—more than mere ornaments. In a seminal
1963 article that gave birth to the field of health economics, Professor
Arrow suggests that the social roles enjoyed by doctors, and the
institutions and norms that characterize the doctor’s position of
authority and deference, arise to solve economic problems inherent in

Copyright © 2009 by Barak Richman.
† Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
1. David F. Levi & Mitu Gulati, Introduction, “Only Connect”: Toward a Unified
Measurement Project, 58 DUKE L.J. 1181, 1181 (2009) (quoting E.M. FORSTER, HOWARD’S END
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the delivery of healthcare. Healthcare services are “nonmarketable”
because, among other reasons, they introduce uncertainty and
unobservability, and thus a physician’s services cannot be evaluated
4
and priced by a market of laypeople. Consequently, Arrow writes,
nonmarket social institutions arise to improve upon the failure of the
5
marketplace. Unlike most businesspeople, physicians are expected to
prescribe advice and treatment that are divorced from their pecuniary
interests, they are not expected to compete with other physicians on
price or through advertising, and they are relied upon as experts.
These nonmarket institutions convince patients they can seek care
that they otherwise would distrust or, at the risk of harming others,
underconsume. The financing and purchase of beneficial healthcare
could not take place without mutually held and widely shared
expectations that physicians are acting with utmost expertise and out
of motivations purely designed to enhance the welfare of their
patients. These expectations, Arrow writes, “are greatly assisted by
having clear and prominent signals” and special relations that come
6
from “various forms of ethical behavior.”
At the postscript of Professor Arrow’s article, he notes that
“[t]he medical profession is only one example” in which market
mechanisms fail to insure against uncertainty and that “[a]ll
7
professions share some of the same properties.” Perhaps he had
judges, and the courtroom, in mind. Similar nonmarket institutions
and norms characterize the social relationships judges have with
laypeople, and these institutions arguably arise to overcome similar
problems of uncertainty. The social institutions and symbols that
surround the judicial role—such as the robe, gavel, honorific title, and
even the power to hold parties in contempt—sustain the authority
that judges require to dispense the law. Individuals follow the law not
just because of the threat of sanctions but also because of a stronglyfelt social norm, a deep reverence for the law, and a widespread belief
in the prudence and integrity of the presiding judge. Indeed, without
such social norms, it would be difficult to employ enough policemen
to force compliance with the law or enough bailiffs to bring order in

3. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REV. 941, 947, 949–51 (1963).
4. See id. at 947, 951.
5. Id. at 947.
6. Id. at 965–66.
7. Id. at 967.
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the courtroom. The severity of a judge’s decrees might even be
compared to the severity of a doctor’s instructions. Failure to adhere
to either is associated not just with risking personal welfare but also
with exhibiting questionable judgment.
Another similarity between doctors and judges—one that is
highlighted by Professor Jack Knight’s excellent contribution to this
Symposium—is that both are members of esteemed and insular
8
communities. Knight refers to the importance of a judge’s
professional community when he writes that the legitimacy of a
judicial decision depends on whether the decision’s reasoning rests on
“a reason that is included in that set of reasons about which there is a
9
social consensus in the legal community.” Thus, judicial legitimacy is
dependent on some notion of a professional community.
Professor Knight’s selection of “community” is very deliberate—
he invokes it eleven times in his article and never uses a substitute
word. Relying on the word has certain costs: it is necessarily vague; as
other commentators at this Symposium have suggested, it means
something different to each judge (some judges seek legitimacy from
fellow members of the bench, others from members of the academy,
and many from ideological organizations such as the Federalist
Society or the American Constitution Society); and it points to an
ineffable motivation or sensibility that is hard to verify or quantify.
As a careful social scientist himself, and particularly as one who (as
he does in this paper) encourages more meaningful empirical
research, Knight might be expected to rely on terms that more easily
succumb to measurement.
Nonetheless, it is precisely the correct word to use. Professor
Knight’s invocation of “community” intersects with another
intellectual tradition that examines the nature of the professions.
Professor William Goode, a former president of the American
Sociological Association (a position that is, for sociologists, the
lawyer’s equivalent of Chief Justice of the United States), wrote a
foundational 1957 article, Community within a Community: The
10
Professions. Goode observed that “a goal of each aspiring

8. Jack Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531, 1550 (2009).
9. Id. at 1553.
10. William J. Goode, Community Within a Community: The Professions, 22 AM. SOC.
REV. 194 (1957).
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that exhibits the

(1) Its members are bound by a sense of identity. (2) Once in it, few
leave, so that it is a terminal or continuing status for the most part.
(3) Its members share values in common. (4) Its role definitions visà-vis both members and non-members are agreed upon and are the
same for all members. (5) Within the areas of communal action
there is a common language, which is understood only partially by
outsiders. (6) The Community has power over its members. (7) Its
limits are reasonably clear, though they are not physical and
geographical, but social. (8) Though it does not produce the next
generation biologically, it does so socially though its control over the
selection of professional trainees, and though its training processes it
12
sends these recruits through an adult socialization process.

By exacting such demands from its members, and by imposing
such demanding entry requirements on potential members, these
professions are able to occupy a privileged status in society, enjoying
more prestige and autonomy than other occupations. They also enjoy
recognition by the “containing community” as having elite education
and socially valuable expertise. This expertise enables a quid-pro-quo,
where the larger society bestows upon the professional community a
vaunted status, consults with them on matters of significant policy,
defers to their judgment, and delegates to them significant regulatory
authority. In turn, the professional community pledges to share the
fruits of their expertise with the rest of society and administer its
power responsibly.
Although Professor Goode writes generally about all professions
and did not write with medical professionals exclusively in mind (he
refers to physicians only in passing illustrations), his description of the
community of professionals—its members’ motivations, its
professional organization, its structural relationship with government
and society, the content and meaning of professional duties and
loyalties—have particular application to the medical profession.
Professor Goode’s article is excerpted at length in the important
Havighurst, Blumstein and Brennan casebook, Health Care Law and
13
Policy, and other sociologists have similarly remarked on the

11. Id. at 194.
12. Id. (footnote omitted).
13. CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, JAMES F. BLUMSTEIN & TROYEN A. BRENNAN, HEALTH
CARE LAW AND POLICY 288–93 (2d ed. 1998).
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importance of professionalism in shaping the delivery of healthcare
and health policy. Professor Paul Starr, for example, attributes the
rise of medical authority to the social origins of professional
14
sovereignty, and Jeffrey Berlant observes that the foothills of the
first Code of Ethics for the American Medical Association (AMA)
was motivated by writers who believed that “the Enlightenment and
rationality were available only to elites paternalistically bound to
assuming the burden of protecting the public [and thus] the only
conceivable authority in medical matters was the practicing medical
15
profession.” This vaunted position of responsibility and authority
strikes a desirable chord for many current physicians, including
Arnold Relman, a former editor of the New England Journal of
Medicine, who includes in “The Role of the Medical Profession” the
chore of making medical decisions and carefully allocating healthcare
16
resources for all of society. The tradition of professionalism has also
been an important force in shaping the field of health law, with “the
professional paradigm” shaping the way lawyers, courts, and legal
scholars look for coherence and integrity to the law’s many
17
interactions with healthcare providers and institutions.
Professionalism’s impact on the delivery of healthcare has been
met with decidedly mixed reviews. To be sure, there is much to
admire from doctors’ commitment to professionalism. We appreciate
the connotation of professionalism with public duty, and the medical
profession deserves admiration for both a general commitment to
healing and a particular commitment to providing medical services to
patients regardless of their ability to pay. In addition, the profession’s
code of ethics directs a fidelity to a patient’s welfare, and this
commitment guides unknowledgeable laypeople through the
complicated health system to receive valuable and often life-saving
care. And professionalism also drives a devotion to science and
discovery. Despite the enormous monetary rewards that the
healthcare financing system brings to innovations and services in
short supply, it is hard to discount the innovators’ underlying
motivation to heal the currently incurable and to advance the
14. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 5–6
(1982).
15. JEFFREY LIONEL BERLANT, PROFESSION AND MONOPOLY 93 (1975).
16. See Arnold S. Relman, The New Medical-Industrial Complex, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED.
963, 967 (1980).
17. See Clark C. Havighurst, The Professional Paradigm of Medical Care: Obstacle to
Decentralization, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 415, 419–29 (1990).
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frontiers of medical knowhow. These benefits might explain the
containing community’s eagerness to support and advance
professional norms and protect professional autonomy. It perhaps
also is a reflection of what has been described as a collective nostalgia
18
for “a simple world of doctors know best.”
However, as scholars of health law perhaps know as well as
anyone else, medical professionalism also has imposed many
significant social costs. The dominance of professionalism has
motivated the AMA and other industry interests to preserve
19
physician autonomy at all costs. Even as physicians claim to
resolutely commit themselves to an ethical concern for patients’
interests, they continue to undermine efforts to restrain healthcare
20
costs or focus on consumer needs. They are disdainful of efforts by
third-party payors—whom physicians often decry as micromanagers
of clinical decisions and intrusive, meddling bureaucrats—to enforce
the limits of insurance contracts, including efforts to stem the costs of
experimental, unproven, or unnecessary but shockingly expensive
21
healthcare services. Physician groups and credentialing societies also
mobilize to prevent less expensive healthcare providers from
encroaching on their occupational territory, enabling them to
22
continue extracting economic rents from premium payers.

18. Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 365, 375 (2006).
19. See STARR, supra note 14, at 300 (“In short, the AMA insisted that all health insurance
plans accept the private physicians’ monopoly control of the medical market and complete
authority over all aspects of medical institutions.”); David Blumenthal, Commentary, The Vital
Role of Professionalism in Health Care Reform, HEALTH AFF., Spring (I) 1994, at 252, 252 (“In
most national health care debates, [professionalism] has been raised principally by opponents of
reform—often organized medicine—and has been used for the explicit purpose of obstructing
progress and protecting the self-interested prerogatives of the medical profession. Whatever the
reform proposal, it is decried as a threat to medical professionalism and implicitly, therefore, a
threat to the quality of care and the satisfaction of patients.”).
20. See Robert A. Berenson, Commentary, Do Physicians Recognize Their Own Best
Interests?, HEALTH AFF., Spring (II) 1994, at 185, 187 (“The profession has proved incapable of
disciplining itself to hold down costs or respond to consumer preferences.”).
21. See id. at 185–86; see also HAVIGURST ET AL., supra note 13, at 1349–52 (documenting
Blue Cross/Blue Shield’s history of expanding insurance coverage and promoting the economic
interests of providers and hospitals).
22. See, e.g., Kreuzer v. Am. Acad. of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(questioning a medical society’s exclusion of a physician, who managed a multi-service practice,
from referral directory); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 192 A.2d 817, 824–25 (N.J. 1963)
(rejecting a hospital medical staff’s efforts to deny staff privileges to an osteopath); STARR,
supra note 14, at 87 (quoting an early physician guide warning doctors to “be on guard against
jealous midwives [and] ignorant doctor-women” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Consequently, professionalism has directly contributed to the nation’s
escalating healthcare costs, which currently are at over 17 percent of
our GDP and are as responsible as anything else for precipitating the
23
current economic crisis.
Professionalism’s dedication to autonomy also has impeded
valuable healthcare innovation and reform. Innovative policy reforms
that aim to redesign the delivery of care (many with proven track
records), such as integrated healthcare or enterprise liability, are met
with resistance from physicians because they require a reorientation
24
of or departure from the doctor’s traditional role. The profession
also flexes its opposition through explicit political activity, with the
AMA’s history of aggressively interfering with policy efforts to
correct the nation’s health disparities or mitigate its budget shortfalls.
Sometimes the profession’s interference was patently illegal; it has an
unpleasant history of orchestrating illegal boycotts to punish early
25
versions of HMOs and other innovative managed care plans. This
history is supplemented by a much longer list of antitrust battles, in
which physicians organized under professional umbrellas to avoid
price competition, prevent advertising and quality competition,
punish innovators or nonconformists, and deny patients the
opportunity to seek alternatives to traditional delivery mechanisms of
23. Healthcare spending in 2009 is projected at 17.6 percent of GDP, the largest in history
and—at one full percentage point larger than 2008—the biggest increase in history. It is
expected to increase annually by 6.2 percent, 2.1 percentage points faster than average annual
growth in GDP. Andrea Sisko et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2018: Recession
Effects Add Uncertainty to the Outlook, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 24, 2009, at w346, w346–47, w356.
Rising healthcare costs (the average cost to insure a family of four is approaching $13,000 a
year) is squeezing working class incomes, precipitating bankruptcies, causing home foreclosures,
triggering layoffs, and spreading the ranks of the uninsured. See HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2008
ANNUAL SURVEY 1 ex.A (2008), available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/7790.pdf (reporting the
average cost of family coverage as $12,680 for 2008); ROBERT W. SEIFERT, ACCESS PROJECT,
HOME SICK: HOW MEDICAL DEBT UNDERMINES HOUSING SECURITY 1 (2005), available at
http://www.accessproject.org/adobe/home_sick.pdf (detailing the effect of medical debt on lowand middle-income families); Christopher Tarver Robertson et al., Get Sick, Get Out: The
Medical Causes of Home Mortgage Foreclosures, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 66 (2008); David U.
Himmelstein et al., Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 2,
2005, at w5-63, w5-66 to -68 (presenting a study detailing the medical causes of bankruptcy).
Many employers fear that health spending may eventually overtake profits. See Will Health
Benefit Costs Eclipse Profits?, MCKINSEY Q. CHART FOCUS (McKinsey & Co., New York,
N.Y.), Sept. 2004, http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/newsletters/chartfocus/2004_09.htm.
24. Alain Enthoven, Curing Fragmentation with Integrated Delivery Systems 9–19 (Aug. 2,
2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
25. See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass’n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff’d, 317
U.S. 519 (1943).
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care. Professionalism pits healthcare providers directly at odds with
the aims of competition and stated antitrust policy.
And, most relevant to the focus of this Symposium, the tradition
of professionalism has contributed to widespread antagonism to
measures of quality. It is commonplace that medical errors are both
pervasive and costly in our healthcare system, but errors are often
depersonalized as either latent errors beyond human control or
intrinsic or endemic error that cannot be avoided. Marianne Paget, a
sociologist whose life was shortened by medical error, observed that:
Physicians do not talk freely about errors in their work. They are
commonly reticent or silent about them. When they do talk, they
frequently prefer technical terms, terms that mask their experience
of error. . . . Too, the idea of endemic error radically undermines
their claim to expertise. Rather, it throws the claim of expertise
under new light. Physicians are “expert” in a work that proceeds by
27
trial and error.

Perhaps this is a professionally-motivated fear of appearing
unprofessional. Professor Arrow would offer a sympathetic, yet
perhaps sardonic, explanation for such fears: since the perception of
expertise—regardless of the underlying reality—supports the
required trust for physician advice and instructions, the mere doubt of
expertise could destabilize a foundation for the delivery of healthcare.
This would explain why outsiders—whether plaintiff attorneys or
health economists—who aim to discover and understand the costs of
medical errors are viewed by physicians with extreme skepticism and
often hostility. It is safe to generalize that doctors have genuine
contempt for the tort system, and they express regular anger that
judges and juries cannot understand the difficulties, demands, and
28
constraints of practicing medicine. They also are resistant to
research that examines the doctor-patient relationship with social
scientific methods, whether seeking systemic causes for misdiagnosis
or inconsistent treatments, because such measurements (they claim)
26. See, e.g., United States v. Or. State Med. Soc’y, 343 U.S. 326, 328–30 (1952).
27. MARIANNE A. PAGET, A COMPLEX SORROW: REFLECTIONS ON CANCER AND AN
ABBREVIATED LIFE 15 (Marjorie L. DeVault ed., 1993) (emphasis omitted).
28. See, e.g., PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN
THE MANAGED CARE ERA 25–26 (2002) (“Physicians resent being sued and having their
clinical practices and motivations impugned by laypersons.”); see also, e.g., George J. Annas,
Doctors and Lawyers and Wolves, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 437, 437 (1989) (lamenting the fact that
“[r]elations between lawyers and physicians . . . are getting more and more destructive and
counterproductive”).
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cannot possibly capture the complexity and nuance of the physician’s
29
responsibilities. And they oppose intelligent efforts to construct
clinical guidelines that might codify standards of care. Such proposals
are derided as advancing “cookbook medicine,” threatening physician
practice autonomy and professional discretion, even though they are
30
sensible attempts to bring accountability for medical errors.
One consequence of such hostility is that these inquiries into the
healthcare system are not met with the seriousness that they deserve.
Reforms to the tort system are badly needed, but physician groups
prefer to impose damage caps rather than to seek institutional
improvements that can uncover and deter errors. And non-medical
disciplines offer tools that can help remedy some of medicine’s most
critical shortcomings. The social sciences can, for example, measure
cognitive biases and heuristics that might unconsciously influence
physician decisionmaking, examine self-dealing and expose the costs
of fee-for-service medicine, and develop organizational efficiencies
that can help reorganize healthcare to contain expenses while
carefully monitoring quality. The industry would benefit enormously
from these inquiries by outsiders, and many of those benefits would
accrue to the professionals themselves.
The question invited by this Symposium is whether any of these
lessons can be fruitfully applied to judges and the judicial process. As
a preliminary matter, there are strong currents of professionalism in
the judiciary. This is vividly captured by Professor Jack Knight’s focus
on how consensus within a legal community bestows legitimacy to
judicial acts. It is also highlighted by Dean Levi and Professor
Gulati’s observation that “there is probably no topic of greater
importance and interest to judges in the United States than judicial
31
independence,” just as physicians have expressed the same devotion
to their own professional autonomy. Many of the motivations,
identities, and values connected to Professor Goode’s description of
professional communities readily apply to the community of judges.

29. See, e.g., JACOBSON, supra note 28, at 154 (“Since [the rise of managed care], physicians
have complained about . . . being second-guessed by non-physician managed care
administrators” even though “[m]ost research has concluded that managed care’s quality is
roughly equivalent (i.e., there are no significant differences in most areas) to quality of care in
the fee-for-service system.”).
30. David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.,
90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 952–53 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Levi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1187.
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Additionally, like doctors, judges and legal academics often
exhibit disregard for, and often hostility toward, outsiders who
employ non-legal analytical methods to assess judicial quality,
understand judicial reasoning, or predict judicial outcomes.
Objections include charges that social scientists rely on imprecise
measurements, excessively narrow (though I prefer the term
“parsimonious”) theoretical constructs, and a general unfamiliarity
with the judicial process. All of these are legitimate objections to the
current literature, and symposia such as this one can lead to
significant improvements in the empirical study of judges. But these
objections also assume a tone of territorialism, that social scientific
methods have nothing to add to—and have no place in—the
discussion of judicial quality. There is something about this
scholarship that seems to threaten judicial authority, something
threatening about the invocation of insights from those outside the
32
judicial and traditional legal community. These reactions very much
resemble physician hostility to efforts by nonphysicians to reform
medicine.
Does this inhospitality to social scientific critiques have
consequences similar to the costly failure to critically examine and
reform the American healthcare system? Professor Kenneth Arrow
might offer a cynical justification—that we need to maintain
perceptions of judicial authority, objectivity, and perhaps infallibility
to maintain social order and sustain compliance with and reverence
for the law. One might call this the Emperor-Has-No-Clothes
defense. We must not look behind the curtain, for once we realize
that judges are as ideological, cognitively biased, and expedient as
other human beings, we will begin to question the social norms that
serve as irreplaceable societal foundations.
A more modest normative conclusion—and the only one I offer
here—is that conferences such as the one that spawned this

32. The Gulati, Choi, and Posner article that ranks judges is perhaps a paradigmatic
example of a quality assessment by outsiders that has traditionally provoked hostility from the
professional community. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Judicial
Evaluations and Information Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE
L.J. 1313, 1317 (2009). Professor Goode writes,
Of course, professions are accustomed to ratings. . . . Professional life is so
fundamentally based on achievement, that such judgments of rank are made
constantly. . . . However, such data are not generally available to the public, and are
not widely known, even when not secret. The professional community will not rank
its members for the larger society; and the latter cannot do so.
Goode, supra note 10, at 198.
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Symposium, in which social scientists and judges are encouraged to
bring their respective and different toolkits to engage constructively
with each other, offer unique opportunities to address these issues.
One issue that I hope is addressed in these and future crossoccupational gatherings—and an issue that I think is ripe for
interdisciplinary
examination—is
the
powerful
strain
of
professionalism in the judicial community. Does appreciating judicial
professionalism bring clarity and transparency to the judicial process,
or does it obfuscate the lucidity of the law? Does it humanize what
judges do, or does it expose an underbelly of judicial decisionmaking?
Does it justify judicial outcomes, or does it immunize judges from
appropriate scrutiny and accountability? I submit that these are
important questions, that interdisciplinary and interprofessional
exchanges such as these are in unique and valuable positions to
address those questions, and that—respectfully—the social scientist
can, as an outsider, generate significant insights into the judicial
process that academic and professional insiders cannot.

